Supreme Court affirms cyber libel prescribes one year from discovery

The Supreme Court (SC) has affirmed its previous ruling that cyber libel prescribes one year from the time it is discovered.

In a resolution written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul Inting, the SC En Banc denied the separate motions for reconsideration filed by Berteni Cataluña Causing and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

In December 2020, Cotabato 2nd District Representative Ferdinand Hernandez filed a cyber libel complaint with the prosecutor against Causing, related to Facebook posts accusing Hernandez of pocketing over ₱200 million in relief goods for Marawi victims. Hernandez stated he discovered the posts on February 4 and April 29, 2019.

Criminal informations were filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against Causing in May 2021. He filed a motion to quash the informations, arguing that they were already time-barred under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) because more than one year had passed since the posts were uploaded.

The RTC denied the motion, ruling that cyber libel prescribes in 12 years under Republic Act No. (RA) 10175 or the Cybercrime Prevention Act.

Causing appealed to the SC, which clarified that the prescriptive period for cyber libel is one year from the date of discovery, consistent with traditional libel under the RPC. The court rejected Causing’s motion to quash the informations due to insufficient proof that the offense had already prescribed, highlighting that he can present evidence during the trial at the RTC.

Both the OSG and Causing filed separate partial motions for reconsideration.

The OSG argued that the one-year prescriptive period for traditional libel under the RPC should not apply to cyber libel. Instead, it should be 15 years under the Cybercrime Prevention Act, as previously decided by the SC through an unsigned resolution in Tolentino vs. People.

Causing, on the other hand, argued that the prescription for cyber libel should start from the publication date rather than from discovery. He contended that online posts are more widespread than traditional forms of publication. If the discovery rule is applied, cyber libel charges could be filed several years after the post was made, as long as the offended party discovered it later.

The SC rejected both arguments.

Under the RPC, written libel prescribes in one year. There is no law that excludes cyber libel from this one-year period, and Congress has consistently treated libel as having a shorter prescriptive period than other crimes, even when penalties are increased.

The SC reiterated that cyber libel is not a separate crime, but rather libel committed through a computer system. The fact that the Cybercrime Prevention Act imposes a higher penalty for cyber libel does not imply that its prescriptive period should be extended beyond that of traditional libel.

The SC added that when laws on the prescription of crimes are unclear, they must be interpreted in favor of the accused. Since the RPC sets a one-year prescriptive period for cyber libel, it prevails over the 15-year period under the Cybercrime Prevention Act.

The SC also affirmed that prescription begins upon discovery of the offense, not upon publication. The law clearly states that prescription runs from the time the crime is discovered by the offended party or the authorities.

The SC rejected the idea that an online publication automatically implies the offended party is presumed to have seen the post. Unlike documents recorded in a public registry, social media posts are not always accessible because their visibility depends on privacy settings, internet access, and social media connections.

The SC also clarified that its earlier ruling in Tolentino v. People, which stated that cyber libel prescribes in 15 years, is not binding on Causing. Because Tolentino was decided through an unsigned resolution, it binds only the parties involved and does not apply to third persons.

In his concurring opinion, Senior Associate Justice Marvic Leonen argued that the one-year prescription period should apply only to libel cases against private individuals. He added that libel against public figures should be decriminalized, as punishing comments and criticisms directed at public officials discourages free and uninhibited discussion about how those in public office conduct themselves.

In his concurring opinion, Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin Caguioa stressed that the prescriptive period for libel has always been fixed at one or two years, never at 10 or more years.

In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Associate Justice Antonio Kho, Jr. agreed with the majority that unsigned resolutions do not lay down doctrines of law. However, he disagreed on the prescriptive period for libel, stating that traditional libel and cyber libel are separate crimes. He said that libel committed through computer systems is punished under the Cybercrime Prevention Act, and the one-year prescriptive period for traditional libel does not apply.

Associate Justices Ramon Paul Hernando, Amy Lazaro-Javier, Ricardo Rosario, Jhosep Lopez, Japar Dimaampao, and Raul Villanueva joined Kho’s dissent.

*Official release from the SC Office of the Spokesperson. For the Supreme Court’s complete discussion of the case, read the full text of the decision in G.R. No. 258524 (Causing v. People).

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